I. Introduction
This chapter provides a review and commentary on the current financial and economic crisis. It considers important analytical and policy issues from a global and North-South perspective. The analytical issues include the reasons for the better than expected performance of the world economy following the early period of acute crisis, the role of global financial imbalances, and whether or not economic theory has been helpful in explaining the causes of the crisis. It is argued that close international cooperation and policy coordination are essential to continued recovery and improvement in the distribution of the fruits of growth. Cooperation and financial regulation are particularly necessary in order to prevent international contagion and cascading sovereign debt defaults. 2 It is generally accepted that the acute phase of the current global financial and economic crisis began in September 2008, with the demise of Lehman Brothers --a leading US investment bank. Eighteen months later, and in the context of the continuing global economic and financial crisis, the following issues require careful analysis:
 Why the world economy has performed so much better than most analysts had expected when the crisis began.  How should the world's financial system be organized so as to secure maximum sustainable and equitable growth for the real world economy?
 The question of government debt and of the danger of inflation.
 Other salient policy issues that have come to the fore, including that of the drawing down of sovereign debt.
While the economic significance of the above issues is self-evident, not all can be treated satisfactorily in a single paper, hence only a relatively few issues will be examined in detail.
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II. Economic and Financial Crisis and the Global Economy
The causes (both short-and longer-term) of the current global economic and financial crisis have been discussed in a number of contributions, including Aiginger (2009) , Eichengreen and O'Rourke (October 2008) , IMF (2008a IMF ( , 2009b , IMF (2009a IMF ( , 2009b IMF ( , 2009c , IMF (2010a IMF ( , 2010b , Krugman (2008 Krugman ( , 2009a Krugman ( , 2009b Krugman ( , 2010 , Ormerod (2010) , Solow (2009) , UNCTAD (2008 UNCTAD ( , 2009 UNCTAD ( , 2010 , UNDESA (2008 UNDESA ( , 2009 UNDESA ( , 2010 , the US Council of Economic Advisers (2010).
It is generally agreed that difficulties associated with the housing segment of the US house property market were the immediate cause of the crisis (See, for example, IMF, 2008a) . Complex financial instruments that incorporated subprime house mortgages lost their value as the housing bubble burst following ten years of continuous price rises based on expectations of a continuation of such increases. This housing bubble occurred despite the fact that during the previous two decades the supply of housing had increased appreciably (Solow, 2009 ). In brief, house prices had risen because interest rates were low and credit was easily available, and prices were expected to continue to increase, much as in the case of the classic tulip mania and bubble in the early 17 th century when, at its peak, the price of a tulip bulb in Holland was equivalent to that of a threestory town house. 4 Housing bubbles have occurred many times before in American economic history without leading to an acute economic and financial crisis, let alone in the rest of the world. This episode was different in that it was accompanied by a bubble in US share and other asset prices. Moreover, the bursting of the US housing bubble led to a fall in share prices not only in the U.S. but also around the world. This was due to the much closer integration of world stock markets resulting from the financial globalization that had occurred in the previous two decades. It is interesting to note that bank losses due to the failure in the subprime mortgages market are estimated to have been around US$ 250 billion.
The consequent financial crisis led to a sharp fall in aggregate world stock market capitalization of the order of US$ 26 trillion in one year -nearly one hundred times larger than the losses associated with sub-prime mortgages. of Lehman Brothers proved too much for the system. As has been described by many others, the breakdown in funding relationships in the weeks following Lehman's collapse was almost unfathomable. The financial system truly froze…'' (Romer, 2010: 3) .
III. Short-and Long-Term Causes of the Crisis
In addition to the literature on the failure of the sub-prime mortgage market, there is by now a relatively large literature on the other short-term as well as 1 These numbers illustrate the orders of magnitude involved in the stock market contagion at that time. In fact in the first six months share prices fell sharply and then rose slowly over the next six months.
6 long-term 'causes' of the current economic and financial crisis, referred to above. It is too near the events to expect a consensus to emerge on the causes of the crisis except perhaps on the observation that it had multiple causes. The diverse contributions on this topic have been succinctly and most helpfully summarized by Aiginger (2009 , Table 1 ). For reasons of space only some of the causes listed in Table 1 are discussed in the following sections.
III.1. Deficits in Regulation
It is widely agreed that a major long-term factor in the making of the crisis was the lack of government regulation, both national and international, of financial institutions in the US and worldwide. In turn, this regulatory deficit appears to have arisen from an ideological faith in the virtues of the free market. It was believed not only that the market was always efficient but that it was also selfcorrecting (See further Ormerod, 2010) .
Alan Greenspan, the former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve (Head of the Central Banking System and the Chief regulator of U.S. monetary policy) in a speech given in April 2005 outlined how innovation had brought about a multitude of new products, speaking approvingly of how such "improvements have led to a rapid growth in sub-prime mortgage lending." (Greenspan, 2005.) 7
The New York Times, reporting on Greenspan's evidence before a 2008 US Congressional Committee, wrote " … Mr. Greenspan conceded error on regulation, stating that he had "put too much faith in the self-correcting powers of free markets ….refused to accept blame for the crisis but acknowledged that his belief in deregulation had been shaken." (Andrews, 2008) .
In testifying before the 2010 U.S. Congress Financial Crisis Inquiry Committee (established to investigate the sub-prime mortgage crisis) Greenspan defended himself against the dual charge that he was responsible for the housing bubble due to his low interest rate policy and for not puncturing the bubble before it reached a level that would cause serious systemic difficulties. Greenspan suggested that his critics had short memories as many of them had earlier applauded sub-prime mortgages as being of tremendous benefit to low-income Americans. Furthermore, he suggested that at the time many people would have questioned whether there was indeed a housing bubble and asked how, in any case, the Federal Reserve would know the answer to this question better than the market. He also told the committee that regulators were helpless to stop the economic meltdown and the sub-prime mortgage crisis (Greenspan, 2010) .
8
The net result of this mindset was the evolution of a largely unregulated parallel banking system performing the functions of banks but without being subject to banking regulations (Krugman, 2008 China's surplus was considerably smaller than that of either Germany or Japan, particularly the latter.
Other RIS data also indicates that the US has been living "beyond its means" The US has been both living beyond its means yet growing faster than other advanced industrial countries such as Germany and Japan who are living within their means. Paradoxically, therefore, the international financial system appears to favour profligacy rather than thrift. Further, capital has been flowing from developing to developed countries (from China to the US, for example), that is, in a direction contrary to that which might be deemed appropriate from a development perspective.
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Even those who do not regard global imbalances (particularly those of China and the US) to be the root cause of the crisis acknowledge that re-balancing is required, principally involving the elimination of high long-term deficits (as in the US) and persistent high surpluses (as in China). In policy terms this means achieving a zero current account deficit at the rate of growth of GDP that would achieve full employment.
In In order to achieve wider rebalancing of the world economy it is also necessary to consider the cases of Japan and Germany as these are also long-term surplus countries (Akyuz, 2010) .
Apart from the trade and current account imbalances, there is another major imbalance in the global economy that requires urgent resolution. This concerns the distribution of both personal and functional income and their implications for aggregate consumption and aggregate demand. Under globalization, the power of workers in most advanced countries has been sharply reduced while that of capital has increased due largely to the free movement of capital. As a consequence, real wage growth has been lower than productivity growth. This process threatens to result in global under-consumption which, other things being equal, will reduce both growth and employment.
To conclude, there is a need to redress imbalances between consumption and investment in major economies. However, it must be noted that, despite a longstanding and growing US current account deficit, there has been no crisis 14 in the sense of a disorderly devaluation of the dollar. This leads some to reject the notion of financial imbalances as being a major cause of the crisis, pointing to the fact that there was no run on the dollar. Opponents of this view suggest that the crisis that emerged in 2008 was due to uncontrolled US deficits.
They further allege that the US took advantage of the US dollar being the world's only reserve currency such that its current account deficits went unchecked.
IV. Why Has The World Economy Performed Better Than Expected?
Christina Romer (Romer 2009) indicates that such volatility has an adverse effect on the level of investment.
Notwithstanding these negative factors, the actual outcomes during the current crisis have fortunately been more benign so far.
During the Great Depression, starting in the late 1920s, the peak-to-trough decline in GDP in the major economies averaged nearly 12 per cent, ranging from 30 per cent in the US and Canada to somewhat under 10 per cent in Japan,
Italy and Britain. The depressed state of the economy continued until the beginning of the Second World War (Llewellyn, 2008 ).
In the current downturn, falls in GDP in the US, Europe and the world economy have been of a much lower order. Although the numbers of unemployed, underemployed and discouraged workers have increased during the current crisis, the rise has been far less than during the 1930s depression. Further, there are signs that it is unlikely to amount to more than 10 per cent of the labour force, and there is evidence that it is decreasing. Table 3 ). As a proportion of their GDP, developing countries in general have had a greater stimulus than developed countries.
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There is evidence that the stimulus has been successful in the sense that, in general, the greater the stimulus received, the greater was countries' economic growth (US Council of Economic Advisers, 2010). Nevertheless, alongside this positive effect of the stimulus, the stimulus created fiscal difficulties for governments, leading to calls for the stimulus to be withdrawn or diminished in size. This would, however, be a serious mistake as a premature withdrawal of the stimulus when the world economy has not yet achieved reasonable economic growth (let alone reverted to its long-term growth rate) may push economies further into recession or even into full-scale depression if there are negative effects on expectations. It is therefore all the more important that the cooperation achieved so far in the G20 arrangement should continue and improve so that there is a coordinated and well organized withdrawal of the fiscal stimulus at the appropriate time. The US experience between 1937 and 1940 (Romer, 2009 ) and that of Japan more recently should be a warning to present-day policymakers in this respect.
The third positive factor that has also helped improve the performance of world economy in relation to the present crisis can be described as an issue of governance. It so happened that economic leadership in the US in this period of crisis was held by an intellectually and politically close group of economists. Advisers), were serious students of the history of the Great Depression and were determined not to repeat the serious policy mistakes made during that period.
To sum up, three factors --namely continuing fast growth in India, China and other developing countries, unprecedented cooperation between countries symbolized by the G20 (see further, below) and the creation and governance by like-minded people of a corrective economic policy programme --have been positive factors in the recent evolution of the world economy. Hopefully, these 7 Most "American Keynesian" economists, following Paul Samuelson, believe in "the Grand Synthesis", that is, that suitable monetary and fiscal policy can restore and maintain full employment and that, in a fully employed economy, neoclassical economics comes into its own. In contrast, "Cambridge Keynesian" economists reject neoclassical economics altogether, but rather believe that monetary and fiscal policy alone will not bring about full employment. In their view, only a "planned" economy in the sense that the government takes a major role in influencing investment decisions (that is indicative planning) can lead to continuous full employment. On the other hand "Chicago" economists believe in the pre-Keynesian classical model whose central distinguishing feature is that is denies the existence of "involuntary" unemployment in the modern economy. These ideas find resonance in modern macro-economics referred to in Section VI.
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factors will continue to operate in this direction, even if certain other developments present obstacles to widespread resumption of reasonable growth rates. As will become clear in the following sections, currency volatility, fiscal deficits and the premature drawing-down of sovereign debt can have a negative impact on the rate of growth.
V. Financial Globalization and the Real Economy
The financial system and the conduct of monetary policy prior to the eruption of the financial crisis and onset of economic recession in 2008 have received thoroughly deserved criticism for allowing the development of the sub-prime mortgage bubble, the stock-market bubble and asset prices bubbles and not puncturing these in time or minimizing the damage. There were, however, some evident benefits, albeit unintended, of this regime for the real economy and which have not been adequately recognized (see below). Without a more balanced picture of the merits and demerits of the pre-crisis financial system and policies, future policy decisions may not be the most appropriate. (Jorgenson and Vu, 2005) . This is an impressive achievement bearing in mind that this is not a "catch-up" economy but one operating at the frontiers of knowledge. Such a productivity increase implies a high degree of technical progress as well as concomitant organizational changes. This achievement would be considered even greater if the benefits of national productivity growth had been spread more widely.
Evidence suggests that the US, India, China and a clutch of other countries --the pre-crisis top performers in terms of growth rates --were overall beneficiaries of international economic integration and financial globalization.
In the case of India and China, this was partly due to the fact that they managed their integration into the global economy so as to avoid the harmful effects of unfettered capital flows in particular. They also pursued a policy of "strategic integration" in relation to trade and long-term investment (Singh, forthcoming).
Financial globalization enabled China to purchase US treasury bills, thereby helping the US to finance its current account deficit and keep US interest rates low. In addition, globalization has helped the US to keep domestic inflation in check, not least through imports of cheap consumer and intermediate products system. These rendered it unsustainable. The best that can be said about the precrisis financial regime is that it demonstrated that the world economy had a growth potential of at least 5 per cent a year on the supply side.
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The purpose of any reform of the financial system should be to allow the world economy to grow at its full potential in a sustainable manner. It would be a travesty of justice from the perspective of the world's poor if any reformed financial system fell short of the sustainable growth objective.
To sum up, it could be argued that the developing world under the recent global regime has taken a giant step forward. A reformed international financial system must underpin and further promote this economic progress.
VI. Economic Theory and the Current Crisis
Economists' analyses and conclusions relating to one particular crisis are not necessarily relevant to another. The analytical lessons derived from the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s do not explain the following crisis that erupted in Asia in the 1990s. Similarly, the lessons of the Asian crisis of the 1990s do not seem to be applicable to the current financial crisis.
The 1980s debt crisis had a devastating impact on Latin America. It is widely agreed that for the continent as a whole it was a "lost decade" characterized by little or no growth and a fall in per capita income of more than 15 per cent over the decade. In contrast, per capita income in East Asian countries grew by more than 50 per cent during this period. There is sharp contention between orthodox 24 and heterodox economists regarding the reasons for the enormous differences in the performance of these two regions. Orthodox economists argue that the Latin America debt crisis was caused by domestic factors, namely micro-economic inefficiencies, macro-economic policy errors, and unwise borrowing and spending. In contrast heterodox economists believe that the Latin American debt crisis was due to external factors over which these countries had no control. In particular, they emphasize the changes in US monetary policy in the late 1970s that resulted in an increase in the real world interest rate from 0.5 per cent in the mid 1970s to 7 per cent in the early 1980s --a fourteen-fold increase --(the so-called "Volcker shock"). The impact on the highly-indebted Latin
American economies was devastating.
Heterodox economists argue that the restrictive changes in US monetary policy had a greater impact on Latin America than Asia. This was partly due to Latin Americas's higher initial level of debt and its structure. In addition, Latin America was more affected by adverse changes in the terms-of-trade than was Asia. 9 Further, as Fishlow (1991) points out, Latin America countries, unlike Asian countries, were subject to capital supply shocks due to contagion. Taken together, as they should be, these shocks were far greater for Latin America than for Asia. Hence Latin America countries became more heavily balance-of-payments constrained and for a much longer period than did the Asian countries. This explains their relatively poor economic performance in the "lost decade" (Singh, 1993) . Thus it is argued that the budget and current account deficits in Latin America were both the cause and consequence of their debt crisis.
The 1997 This version of events is highly disputed by heterodox economists. They argue that the root cause of the crisis was the introduction of financial liberalization before prudential regulation had been instituted. They point out that other countries, including China and India, which did not fully liberalize their financial sectors escaped the crisis, whereas countries that did (Indonesia, Korea, Thailand) were badly affected. In sum, it is suggested here that the Asian crisis was due to financial liberalization and the absence of prudential regulation; rather than "too much government" it was a case of too little government.
The essential point, however, is to emphasize that each economic and financial crisis is of a rather different nature. One hallmark of the present crisis has been the credit crunch, whereby banks stopped lending to other banks and businesses, thereby disrupting the system of credit that oils the workings of a modern economy. In response, governments resorted to bailing out banks and other financial institutions that were deemed too big to be allowed to fail, in the sense that their failure would have enormous external diseconomies for other firms and institutions.
27 Thus, analyses of major financial crises during the past four decades are not directly applicable to the current crisis. Each crisis has been different from the one before. Every major crisis therefore needs to be examined in its own right with a fresh eye, before any firm analytical and policy conclusions can be drawn from that experience.
In addition to analyzing crisis episodes it is essential to examine the role of basis of the micro-economic theory that underlies the macro construction. In sum, it is assumed that households maximize utility, firms maximize profits and economic agents make decisions on the basis of rational expectations. These ideas have led to sophisticated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE) that are so complex that they cannot be solved analytically. Rather, they require numerical methods and considerable computer power for their solution. Nevertheless, such models have been singularly unhelpful in predicting the current crisis. It is convincingly argued by Ormerod (2010) that 28 these models are based on risk calculations but do not take into account uncertainty. (Risk is predictable in the sense that the probability distribution of future outcomes can be estimated. This is not so at all for uncertainty.) Ormerod (2010) observes: "in the brave new world of DSGE, the possibility of a systemic collapse, of a cascade of defaults across the system, was never considered."
Nevertheless, when it came to devising the policy response to the crisis, key policy-makers gained greater wisdom from basic Keynesian economic theory and from economic history rather than from modern macroeconomics. US and
European economic advisors and policy-makers drew on the former and defined the essential problem of the crisis in terms of a shortage of world aggregate demand, and referred to the economic history of the Great Depression to avoid the policy mistakes of that period. It is commonly believed that the failure of several thousand banks in the US in the 1930s contributed to the prolongation of the Great Depression. This explains the priority given to saving the financial system through unprecedented bail-outs. 10 Similarly, the success of the giant economic stimulus programmes associated with the New Deal suggested that similar measures should be used once again to a avert a worsening recession.
10 Lessons also need to be drawn from the recent history of Japan, whose average annual growth rate for the first decade of the 2000s fell to a mere 1 per cent. Greater research efforts devoted to understanding the Japanese case are likely to be more rewarding than further developing DSGE models.
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VII. Conclusion: The Way Forward
The ongoing policy collaboration between countries provides one of the chief grounds for optimism. Nevertheless, there are well-founded criticisms regarding the legitimacy of the exclusive G20 group. Many G20 members are disappointed with the process because the G7 have yet to agree on meaningful reform of the IMF Articles of Agreement, including the weighting of voting power (Chin (2010) and Helleiner and Kirshner (2009) . Nevertheless, the G20 process remains a promising start to more meaningful international cooperation.
It has been argued that agreement among the G20 has been entirely due to the recent adverse circumstances and that, once the world economy recovers, collective action will cease. However, on a priori grounds, an equally if not more plausible scenario is that the evident success of collective action will encourage nation states to take further coordinated action. Indeed, it can be argued that an international cooperation is imperative if global imbalances are to be corrected.
Although the world economy's growth path for the period 2000-2007 was ultimately unsustainable, due in part to the rising US current account deficit and in part to the weaknesses of the financial system, such growth certainly took the global economy a long way forward in various respects. The important issue 30 now is which factors will determine the outcome for the real world economy in the next decade or two after the crisis? Will there be a new growth path and will it be more or less satisfactory than the previous one, from an economic, social and environmental point of view? What is required is a growth path that allows the world economy to operate at its full sustainable potential, while reducing the risks of renewed global financial fragility and crisis.
The central message of this contribution is that, for this to be possible, increasing global co-operation is essential in trade and investment and in the related fields of food, environment and energy. Equally importantly, a more equal distribution of income, wealth, and social protection, as well as returns to capital and labour, are needed, not only for their own sake but also to resolve the incipient world under-consumption problem before this becomes a serious obstacle to fast economic growth, and for the sake of world peace.
It is, however, appropriate to ask whether the above is likely to happen? The most optimistic outcome is one in which the worst of the crisis is over: the global financial system has been thoroughly reformed and ensures stability and Even unemployment, which is normally a lagging indicator, has at long last begun to decline albeit slowly, at least in the US (Chandra, 2010) . These recent short-term improvements can be interpreted as suggesting that the evolution of the world economy is pointing in a positive direction. However, Blanchard warns that these "good numbers hide a more complex reality, namely a tepid recovery in many advanced economies, and a much stronger one in most emerging and developing economies." While maybe somewhat disappointing for advanced economics this scenario suggests some progress greater balance in the world economy.
One of the biggest global worries concerns the current European sovereign debt situation that has major implications for the world economy. 12 An even more pessimistic scenario would, as noted above, involve contagion beyond Europe and wider sovereign debt default. In the absence of coordinated policies and action, such a development would result in widespread financial chaos, economic disruption, unemployment and lower standards of living for many people worldwide.
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To sum up, the current challenge to policymakers around the world is first and foremost to avoid long-term stagnation resulting from injudicious policies. This would suggest, inter alia, resisting a premature drawing down of government debt in rich countries. The associated reduction in state expenditure and increases in taxation are likely to prolong recession and unemployment, with consequent ripple effects that result in continued long-term stagnation throughout the global economy.
In addition, concerted action is required to introduce national and international supervision and regulation of financial markets, while measures are also needed to achieve a rebalancing of the global economy such that it reaches its full potential, while also achieving an improvement in inter-country distribution of growth and development. In short, markets should serve the people rather than determining their socio-economic destiny.
13 13 It will be argued by some that reduced long-term economic growth may be positive by effecting a reduction in global warming and conserving natural resources. However, important issues such climate change and redistribution of income are beyond the scope of this short paper. 
